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LEGITIMACY AND HATE SPEECH 
Robert Post* 
It is a pleasure to participate in this symposium on 
democratic legitimacy and hate speech regulation. Although I 
have often contemplated the relationship between First 
Amendment doctrine and democratic legitimation, I have always 
done so in the manner of a legal scholar.1 I have not inquired—as 
perhaps a moral philosopher might—about what James Weinstein 
calls “the objective criteria that morally entitle a political entity to 
govern.”2 I find myself unmoved to speculate about such objective 
normative criteria, and am instead content to focus on the 
descriptive conditions necessary for a diverse and heterogeneous 
population to live together in a relatively peaceable manner under 
a common system of governance and politics. 
Among those conditions is a population’s belief that their 
existing system of governance and politics is legitimate. A moral 
philosopher may take this belief for granted. She might posit that 
persons who otherwise disagree may nevertheless “consent to be 
bound by some decision-procedure . . . that might well involve 
something less than unanimity.”3 But the essential question for 
legal scholars is how that consent is actually sustained and 
maintained in the face of intense conflict. In this comment, 
therefore, I shall focus on the maintenance of what Weinstein 
calls “descriptive legitimacy.”4 
In Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 
Weinstein explores the descriptive legitimacy of individual laws. 
This is a complicated and largely idiosyncratic question. 
 
 * Many thanks to Jesse Hogin for extremely helpful research assistance. 
 1. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2014); ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (reprt. 
2013). 
 2. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 527, 534 (2017). 
 3. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 139–40 (1999). 
 4. Weinstein, supra note 2, at 533–34. 
6 - POST.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17  9:56 AM 
652 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:651 
 
Individual laws become descriptively illegitimate primarily 
because they are mismatched to the mores of the population to 
which they are applied. Thus the 18th Amendment (establishing 
Prohibition) was widely regarded as illegitimate throughout the 
Northeast and the 15th Amendment (prohibiting racial 
discrimination in voting) was effectively illegitimate throughout 
the South during the century after its enactment.5 
It is conceivable that regulations of speech might undermine 
the descriptive legitimacy of specific laws. If persons were 
permitted to speak in favor of a law’s enactment but not against 
its enactment, the law might emerge with attenuated legitimacy. 
Certainly, we have experienced analogous phenomenon with 
respect to the executive branch: It is commonly thought, for 
example, that the legitimacy of the Adams administration was 
undermined by the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which sharply 
curtailed criticism of the administration’s policies.6 Similarly the 
gag rule prohibiting anti-slavery petitions in the House of 
Representatives in the 1830s and 40s helped to undermine pro-
slavery views in the North.7 
Weinstein argues that hate-speech bans function analogously 
to undermine the legitimacy of particular laws whose subject 
matter is related to hate speech, like laws prohibiting 
discrimination or determining immigration quotas. Whether such 
bans have this effect depends, in part, on the kinds of 
communication that they suppress. One of the difficulties of 
discussing hate-speech laws is the notorious indeterminacy of 
their reach.8 
 
 5. Robert C. Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American 
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2006); 
see also Jeremy Amar-Dolan, The Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment 
Standard of Review, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1477, 1482 (2014); N. Jay Shepherd, “Abridge” 
Too Far: Racial Gerrymandering, the Fifteenth Amendment, and Shaw v. Reno, 14 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L. J. 337, 348–49 (1994); Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Judicial 
Construction of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 
337, 338 (1996). 
 6.  E.g., DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 504–05 (1st Touchstone ed. 2002); 
THOMAS J. CRAUGHWELL & M. WILLIAM PHELPS, FAILURES OF THE PRESIDENTS 36–37 
(2008); MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 286 
(rev. ed. 2009). 
 7. Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Charles Stewart III, The Gag Rule, Congressional Politics, 
and the Growth of Anti-Slavery Popular Politics (Apr. 16, 2005), http://web.mit.edu
/cstewart/www/gag_rule_v12.pdf. 
 8. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 267 (1991). 
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Thus, Jeremy Waldron errs by interpreting Section 18(1) of 
the UK’s Public Order Act of 1986 to require “specific intent” to 
“stir up racial hatred.”9 The Act also allows punishment for 
“threatening, abusive or insulting words” if, “having regard to all 
the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.”10 
(By contrast, the 2006 amendment of the Public Order Act forbids 
words that stir up religious hatred only if there is also specific 
intent to do so.11) It is conceivable that speech opposing the 
enactment of statutes penalizing racial discrimination or opposing 
immigration might be understood as abusive and as likely to stir 
up racial hatred. The recent prosecution and conviction of Geert 
Wilders in the Netherlands for advocating the curtailment of 
Moroccan immigration comes disturbingly close to such a 
scenario.12 
If hate-speech bans are capaciously interpreted in this way—
and Weinstein’s fine article shows that the hate-speech laws can 
be construed in distressingly broad ways—then statutes 
prohibiting racial discrimination or encouraging immigration may 
well suffer from diminished legitimacy. I do not argue that 
persons whose hate speech has been suppressed are under no 
obligation to obey such statutes, for I am discussing only 
descriptive legitimacy. My point is rather that persons prevented 
 
 9. Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James Weinstein, 
32 CONST. COMMENT. 697, 702; Jeremy Waldron, Hate Speech and Free Speech, Part Two, 
N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jun. 18, 2012, 9:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes
.com/2012/06/18/hate-speech-and-free-speech-part-two/?_r=0. 
 10. Public Order Act of 1986, c. 64 § 18(1)(b) (Eng.). 
 11. Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006, c. 1 § 29B(1) (Eng.). The 2006 Act also 
contains an express provision protecting “freedom of expression” in the context of stirring 
up religious hatred, Section 29J, which the 1986 Act does not contain in the context of 
stirring up racial hatred. 
 12. See, e.g., Nina Siegal, Geert Wilders, Dutch Politician, Distracts From Hate-Speech 
Trial With More Vitriol, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/11/01/world/europe/geert-wilders-netherlands-hate-trial.html (The trial of Wilders, 
who is accused of hate speech, “revolves around two sets of remarks made near the time 
of municipal elections in The Hague in 2014. On March 12 of that year, Mr. Wilders told 
the Dutch national broadcaster NOS that he hoped the city’s residents would ‘vote for a 
more safe and social city, and if it would be possible, fewer Moroccans.’ At a rally a week 
later, he asked, ‘Do you want more or fewer Moroccans in this city and in the 
Netherlands?’ The audience responded by chanting, ‘Fewer, fewer!’ Mr. Wilders 
responded, ‘Well, we’ll arrange that, then.’”). See Nina Siegal, Geert Wilders, Dutch Far-
Right Politician, is Convicted of Inciting Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 9, 2016), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/world/europe/geert-wilders-netherlands-
trial.html?_r=0. 
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from expressing opposition to a statute are likely to regard the 
statute as unfairly enacted. 
It is not sufficient to observe that members of a legislative 
assembly are free to express their opposition to the statute, 
because persons outside the assembly have been prohibited from 
influencing the decision of their representatives. Freedom of 
speech underwrites democratic legitimation when it allows 
persons to participate in the formation of public opinion and when 
persons believe that the state will (generally) be responsive to 
public opinion. A major reason why modern democracies protect 
freedom of speech is to endow persons with the sense that their 
government might be responsive to them. 
The sense of responsiveness produced by freedom of speech 
is more ubiquitous and more continuous than that produced by 
voting. Thus, James Bryce noted long ago that although public 
“opinion declares itself legally through elections,” it “is at work at 
other times also, and has other methods of declaring itself.”13 
Elections are only an “intermittent mechanism,” whereas public 
opinion is “constantly active” and, “in the long run,” can exercise 
“a great and growing influence.”14 Bryce observed that public 
opinion “rules as a pervading and impalpable power, like the 
ether which . . . passes through all things. It binds all the parts of 
the complicated system together and gives them whatever unity 
of aim and action they possess.”15 
The state risks alienating persons if it truncates their access 
to this “pervading and impalpable power.” That is ultimately the 
connection between freedom of speech and descriptive 
democratic legitimacy. Under conditions of intense conflict, 
persons who have no reason to believe that their speech can 
 
 13. 3 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 159 (New York, MacMillan 
& Co. 1888). 
 14. 3 BRYCE, supra note 13, at 159. Goldwin Smith simultaneously made an 
analogous observation: 
Parliaments are losing much of their importance, because the real deliberation is 
being transferred from them to the press and the general organs of discussion by 
which the great questions are virtually decided, parliamentary speeches being 
little more than reproductions of arguments already used outside the House, and 
parliamentary divisions little more than registrations of public opinion. It is not 
easy to say how far, with the spread of public education, this process may go, or 
what value the parliamentary debate and division list will in the end retain. 
Goldwin Smith, The Machinery of Elective Government, 20 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 628, 
629–30 (1882). 
 15. 3 BRYCE, supra note 13, at 30. 
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influence the shape of public opinion will have less reason to live 
together in a relatively peaceable manner under a common 
system of governance and politics. Those who intensely oppose 
the enactment of antidiscrimination statutes or of statutes 
allowing immigration, but who are prohibited from articulating 
their opposition by the implementation of broad hate-speech 
laws, would have every reason to distrust the legitimacy of 
statutes ultimately enacted. They have been excluded from the 
formation of the public opinion to which their representatives are 
supposed to be responsive. Democratic accountability has been 
short-circuited. 
Of course most hate-speech laws do not function to prevent 
communications about specific legislation. Indeed, it is sometimes 
argued that hate-speech laws do not prevent anyone from 
communicating any ideas at all; they instead merely prevent 
especially abusive or outrageous ways of communicating ideas.16 
The distinction between regulating the manner of speech, as 
distinct from its matter, is woven rather deeply into the texture of 
British law.17 But it has been rejected in American law on the 
ground that the manner in which a thought is phrased is 
inseparably connected to the substance of the thought.18 
The poet Shelley makes this same point when he speaks of 
the “vanity of translation.”19 He argues that poetry cannot be 
 
 16. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430–32 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 17. See Peter Jones, Blasphemy, Offensiveness and Law, 10 BRIT. J.POL. SCI. 129, 
141–42 (1980). Jones himself rejects the distinction: 
The failing of the matter-manner distinction is that it supposes that statements 
are capable of more or less offensive formulations which are nevertheless 
identical in meaning. The manner of an assertion is treated as though it were so 
much verbal wrapping paper whose features had no bearing upon the content of 
the parcel. In certain cases this assumption may not be unjustified. . . . More often, 
however, manner and matter are so integrally related that it is impossible to 
distinguish the offensive manner from the offensive matter of a statement. Id. at 
142–43. 
 18. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971). 
 19. 1 PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, A Defense of Poetry, in ESSAYS, LETTERS FROM 
ABROAD, TRANSLATIONS AND FRAGMENTS 1 (1840). Shelley writes: 
Sounds as well as thoughts have relation both between each other and towards 
that which they represent, and a perception of the order of those relations has 
always been found connected with a perception of the order of the relations of 
thoughts. Hence the language of poets has ever affected a certain uniform and 
harmonious recurrence of sound, without which it were not poetry, and which is 
scarcely less indispensable to the communication of its influence, than the words 
themselves, without reference to that peculiar order. Hence the vanity of 
translation; it were as wise to cast a violet into a crucible that you might discover 
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translated, because the content of ideas is indistinguishable from 
the physical language in which ideas are conveyed. And poets are 
not the only ones who imagine language in this way.20 To the 
extent that language is conceived as thick and material, as 
resisting translation, hate-speech regulations must be understood 
as suppressing particular ideas from being communicated. 
Although we may assume that these ideas do not concern specific 
pending or potential legislation, we must also assume that they are 
ideas which can be expressed only in the particular outrageous 
style that hate-speech regulations proscribe. A question posed by 
this symposium is the relationship between such proscriptions and 
descriptive legitimacy. 
To parse this question, we must imagine a society where 
persons wish to communicate ideas but are frustrated in their 
efforts by the operation of hate-speech regulations. We must 
assume that they can communicate their precise ideas only in the 
kind of abusive language that hate-speech regulations suppress. If 
the point of freedom of speech is to allow persons in a 
heterogeneous society to live together peaceably because they are 
authorized to express their ideas in ways they believe are best 
designed to influence public opinion, it is no good at all to say to 
those who have been censored by hate-speech regulations that 
“the fundamental debate about race is over—won, finished.”21 
Such persons by hypothesis do not believe that the debate is over. 
The point of freedom of speech is in any event not 
epistemological; it is political. It expresses a guarantee of political 
equality in the formation of public opinion. 
We protect freedom of speech to allow persons of widely 
varying views to experience as legitimate a government that may 
nevertheless act in ways that are inconsistent with their own ideas. 
 
the formal principle of its color and odor, as seek to transfuse from one language 
into another the creations of a poet. The plant must spring again from its seed, or 
it will bear no flower—and this is the burden of the curse of Babel. 
 20. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida & Lawrence Venuti, What is a “Relevant” Translation? 
27 CRITICAL INQUIRY 174, 183 (2001): 
[T]he fact is that any translating replaces the signifiers constituting the foreign 
text with another signifying chain, trying to fix a signified that can be no more 
than an interpretation according to the intelligibilities and interests of the 
receiving language and culture. 
See also DOUGLAS ROBINSON, THE TRANSLATOR’S TURN 240 (1991) (noting that it’s 
impossible to transfer “meaning from one language to another intact, without change, 
without diminishment . . .”).  
 21. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 195 (2012). 
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What maintains descriptive legitimacy in such circumstances is the 
continuous hope that government actions might be swayed by 
changes in a public opinion to which persons are given full and 
open access. If persons are prevented from expressing their own 
views—however much others might find those views outrageous 
and intolerable—then they are less likely to experience their 
government as legitimate. This is what I believe Weinstein has in 
mind when he says that hate-speech laws do not operate in a 
“viewpoint neutral”22 way and hence that they are especially 
damaging to democratic legitimacy. 
The maintenance of “democratic legitimacy” is meant to 
maximize the likelihood that persons of diverse perspectives can 
nevertheless live together in peace under a single system of 
government. It is a precondition for maintaining a political society 
in the face of profound heterogeneity. Because without a viable 
political society no values of any kind can be sustained, 
descriptive democratic legitimacy must rank among the most 
fundamental values of our system. 
Notice that on this account, hate-speech regulation causes 
systemic damage to democratic legitimation. The impact of such 
regulation does not pertain to individual laws but instead to the 
risk that persons may come to distrust a political system that holds 
out the promise of self-determination but that refuses to hear 
what persons actually have to say. Notice further that this damage 
is a matter of degree. It will depend on variables such as the 
number of persons who actually wish to engage in proscribed hate 
speech, the intensity of their views, and so on. Finally, notice that 
this variable amount of damage will occur categorically by legally 
proscribing hate speech. 
Of course hate speech itself may damage democratic 
legitimation. No one doubts that hate speech causes many kinds 
of harm. A particularly virulent form of harm is the sense among 
target groups that they are excluded from, or not entitled to 
participate in, the relevant demos. To the extent that hate speech 
instills this sense of marginalization and distrust, it also corrodes 
democratic legitimation. This harm is also systematic, and it is also 
a matter of degree. The extent of the damage will depend on 
variables like the number of persons in target groups, the intensity 
of their sense of exclusion, and so on. 
 
 22. Weinstein, supra note 2, at 545–56. 
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In contrast to proscriptions of hate speech, however, this 
harm is not categorically caused by allowing hate speech. It 
depends on the ambient legal and social environment and on 
whether, for example, members of target groups nevertheless feel 
welcome, as for example by non-discriminatory access to housing, 
employment, health care, police protection, and so on. If the 
ambient legal and social environment makes members of target 
groups feel safe and included, then allowing hate speech will not 
damage democratic legitimation, regardless of the existence of 
hate speech. 
If this analysis is correct, democratic legitimacy is at stake on 
both sides of the equation. It is undermined by prohibiting hate 
speech; but it is also undermined by allowing hate speech, to a 
degree that is affected by multiple other potential actions of the 
state. This conclusion suggests that the ultimate effect of hate-
speech regulation on democratic legitimacy is a contextual matter 
that will depend on the particularities of national circumstances. 
I have always thought, for example, that one reason why the 
United States refuses to prohibit hate speech in public 
discourse—whereas European nations allow much more 
capacious regulation of such hate speech—is that the need for 
democratic legitimation is far greater in the United States than in 
Europe.23 There is more deference to government regulation in 
Europe than in the United States, where state action is typically 
viewed with thinly-veiled hostility. The “democratic deficit” that 
presently afflicts the EU, for example, would never be tolerated 
in the United States. That is because the United States is a nation 
of extreme individualists, where allegiance to the state is 
frequently tenuous. Freedom of speech is consequently of greater 
importance here because it creates a safety-valve deemed 
necessary to prevent persons from becoming too alienated. 
It is characteristic of American jurisprudence that it seeks to 
mitigate the undeniable damage of hate speech in public discourse 
by punishing hate speech outside of public discourse. In the 
United States hate speech is typically banned in educational 
settings, in work environments, and so on. Because 
communication in schools or in workplaces is not constitutionally 
characterized as an effort to influence the content of public 
 
 23. Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123 (Ivan 
Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). 
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opinion, it can be (and is) freely regulated to prevent hate 
speech.24 In the United States, the suppression of hate speech thus 
depends on the constitutional nature of the speech in question. 
My instinct is to resist simple and universal prescriptions in 
the matter of hate speech. We would do well to understand why 
different legal systems have undertaken such different 
approaches to this difficult problem. We would do well to 
understand how constitutional law differently characterizes 
distinct communicative acts. We would do well to understand such 
characterizations in light of a broader ecology of national 
solidarity. My guess is that one cannot begin seriously to address 
such questions without almost immediately encountering the 
central role of descriptive legitimacy in the regulation of 
communication. 
 
 
 24. See Post, supra note 8; Robert Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment, 
in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 382 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2004); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and 
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). 
